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THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: POTENTIAL
APPLICATION TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The False Claims Act' is a civil remedy for the restitution to the
government of monies fraudulently obtained from the government.
The Act provides for a civil suit, by either the federal government or a
private plaintiff, for restitution plus a $2,000 statutory penalty where
allegedly fraudulent claims have been presented for payment from the
United States Treasury. 2 Section 231 is the substantive provision of the
Act delineating the circumstances in which a remedy will be available. 3
1. 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-233, 235 (1976).
2. A consideration worthy of note is that the Act is not an exclusive remedy,
although it appears to be the only one providing for specific restitution. There are
available to the government various other actions for the vindication of wrongs committed in the obtaining and use of government funds. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, 15
(1976) (Sherman Anti-Trust Act); 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (1976) (false certification in
military procurement contracts); 18 U.S.C. §§ 287, 1001 (1976) (criminal counterpart
to the False Claims Act); 40 U.S.C. § 471 (1976) (Surplus Property Act).
3. 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1976) provides:
Any person not in the military or naval forces of the United States, or in the
militia called into or actually employed in the service of the United States, who
shall make or cause to be made, or present or cause to be presented, for payment
or approval, to or by any person or officer in the civil, military, or naval services
of the United States, any claim upon or against the Government of the United
States, or any department or officer thereof, knowing such claim to be false, ficti-

tious, or fraudulent, or who, for the purpose of obtaining or aiding to obtain the
payment or approval of such claim, makes, uses, or causes to be made or used,
any false bill, receipt, voucher, roll, account, claim, certificate, affidavit, or
deposition, knowing the same to contain any fraudulent or fictitious statement or
entry, or who enters into any agreement, combination, or conspiracy to defraud
the Government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof, by obtaining or aiding to obtain the payment or allowance of any false or fraudulent
claim, or who, having charge, possession, custody, or control of any money or
other public property used or to be used in the military or naval service, who, with
intent to defraud the United States or willfully to conceal such money or other
property, delivers or causes to be delivered, to any other person having authority
to receive the same, any amount of such money or other property less than that
for which he received a certificate or took a receipt, and every person authorized
to make or deliver any certificate, voucher, receipt, or other paper certifying the
receipt of arms, ammunition, provisions, clothing, or other property so used or to
be used, who makes or delivers the same to any other person without a full knowledge of the truth of the facts stated therein, and with intent to defraud the United
States, and every person who knowingly purchases or receives in pledge for any
obligation or indebtedness from any soldier, officer, sailor, or other person called
into or employed in the military or naval service any arms, equipments, ammuni-

tion, clothes, military stores, or other public property, such soldier, sailor, officer,
or other person not having the lawful right to pledge or sell the same, shall forfeit
and pay to the United States the sum of $2,000, and, in addition, double the
amount of damages which the United States may have sustained by reason of the
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Section 232 is the major procedural provision, and outlines the parties
4
and the steps necessary to pursue a suit under the Act. Taken
together, sections 231 and 232 are both broad and complex.
doing or committing such act, together with the costs of suit; and such forfeiture
and damages shall be sued for in the same suit.
4. 31 U.S.C. § 232 (1976) provides:
(A) The several district courts of the United States, the several district courts of
the Territories of the United States, within whose jurisdictional limits the person
doing or committing such act shall be found, shall wheresoever such act may have
been done or committed, have full power and jurisdiction to hear, try, and determine such suit.
(B) Except as hereinafter provided, such suit may be brought and carried on by
any person, as well for himself as for the United States, the same shall be at the
sole cost and charge of such person, and shall be in the name of the United States,
but shall not be withdrawn or discontinued without the consent, in writing, of the
judge of the court and the United States attorney, first filed in the case, setting
forth their reasons for such consent.
(C) Whenever any such suit shall be brought by any person under clause (B) of
this section notice of the pendency of such suit shall be given to the United States
buy serving upon the United States attorney for the district in which such suit
shall have been brought a copy of the bill of complaint and by sending, by
registered mail, or by certified mail, to the Attorney General of the United States
at Washington, District of Columbia, a copy of such bill together with a
disclosure in writing of substantially all evidence and information in his possession
material to the effective prosecution of such suit. The United States shall have
sixty days, after service as above provided, within which to enter appearance in
such suit. If the United States shall fail, or decline in writing to the court, during
said period of sixty days to enter any such suit, such person may carry on such
suit. If the United States within said period shall enter appearance in such suit the
same shall be carried on solely by the United States. In carrying on such suit the
United States shall not be bound by any action taken by the person who brought
it, and may proceed in all respects as if it were instituting the suit: Provided, That
if the United States shall fail to carry on such suit with due diligence within a
period of six months from the date of its appearance therein, or within such additional time as the court after notice may allow, such suit may be carried on by the
person bringing the same in accordance with clause (B) of this section. The court
shall have no jurisdiction to proceed with any suit brought under clause (B) of this
section or pending suit brought under this section whenever it shall be made to appear that such suit was based upon evidence or information in the possession of
the United States, or any agency, officer or employee thereof, at the time such suit
was brought: Provided, however, That no abatement shall be had as to a suit pending on December 23, 1943, if before such suit was filed such person had in his
possession and voluntarily disclosed to the Attorney General substantial evidence
and information which was not theretofore in the possession of the Department of
Justice.
(D) In any suit whether or not on appeal pending on December 23, 1943,
brought under this section, the court in which such suit is pending shall stay all
further proceedings, and shall forthwith cause written notice, by registered mail,
or by certified mail, to be given the Attorney General that such suit is pending,
and the Attorney General shall have sixty days from the date of such notice to appear and carry on such suit in accordance with clause (C) of this section.
(E)(l) In any such suit, if carried on by the United States as herein provided, the
court may award to the person who brought such suit, out of the proceeds of such
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The purpose of the Act is, quite simply, to protect the funds of the
United States from false claims, and to provide for restitution of those
funds obtained by fraudulent means. 5 Recent cases emphasize that the
forfeiture and damages provisions are specifically designed to make the
government whole.'
Although there is a wealth of case law concerning the Act, 7 the
greatest proportion of it deals with government contractors. Cases
concerning the Act have generally arisen in the context of commercial
contracts between the government and private parties, particularly
with construction and machinery contractors. 8 Another large category
of cases stems from fraudulent claims for benefits made on government agencies like the Veteran's Administration and the Federal Housing Authority.9
This comment delineates the potential scope of the Act's application to Members of Congress. The literal scope of the statute certainly
includes Members; nowhere has it been posited that this is not the
case." ° In only three cases has the Act been utilized in an attempt to
suit or any settlement of any claim involved therein, which shall be collected,
an
amount which in the judgment of the court is fair and reasonable compensation
to
such person for disclosure of the information or evidence not in the possession
of
- the United States when such suit was brought. Any such award shall in no
event
exceed one-tenth of the proceeds of such suit or any settlement thereof.
(2) In any such suit when not carried on by the United States as herein provided, whether heretofore or hereafter brought, the court may_ award to the person
who brought such suit and prosecuted it to final judgment, or to settlement,
as
provided in clause (B) of this section, out of the proceeds of such suit or any
settlement of any claim involved therein, which shall be collected, an amount, not
in
excess of one-fourth of the proceeds of such suit or any settlement thereof, which
in the judgment of the court is fair and reasonable compensation to such person
for the collection of any forfeiture and damages; and such person shall be entitled
to receive to his own use such reasonable expenses as the court shall find to
have
been necessarily incurred and all costs the court may award against the defendant,
to be allowed and taxed according to any provision of law or rule of court
in
force, or that shall be in force in suits between private parties in said court: Provided, That such person shall be liable for all costs incurred by himself in such
case and shall have no claim therefore on the United States.
5. See, e.g., Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
6. See, e.g., Peterson v. Richardson, 370 F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd,
508 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1975).
7. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Equifax, 557 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Cooperative Grain & Supply Co., 476 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1973). See also Annot.,
26
A.L.R. FED. 307 (1976); Annot., 19 L. Ed. 2d 1558 (1968).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1972);
United States v. National Wholesalers, 236 F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 1956).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1966);
Alperstein v. United States, 291 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1961), aff'g 183 F. Supp. 548
(S.D.
Fla. 1960); United States v. Polly, 255 F. Supp. 610 (W.D.N.C. 1966); United
States v.
Schmidt, 204 F. Supp. 540 (E.D. Wis. 1962).
10. See Hollander v. Clay, 420 F. Supp. 853 (D.D.C. 1976).
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force Members of Congress to make restitution for the alleged inten-

tional misuse of official monies." In several of the more recent cases

2
involving the Act, the procedural oddities' of the statute have effectively blocked attempts to litigate the questions presented. This reading
of the procedural requirements may make the statute, in practical
terms, only minimally effective against Members of Congress.

II.

HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE ACT,

The False Claims Act was first enacted in 1863.'1 As originally
enacted, the Act encompassed both civil and criminal remedies and
was intended as the comprehensive measure with regard to this type of
fraud.' 4 These provisions were later recodified, creating two distinct
remedies, one civil and one criminal." The criminal provision was
repealed in 1909.16 The criminal provision, in spite of its repeal, "has
continued vitality ... insofar as it specifies the acts giving rise to civil
liability under § 3490."" The civil provision incorporates the language
8
of the repealed criminal provision for the definition of liability.' The
v. Hays,
11. Joseph v. Cannon, No. 7-0452 (D.D.C. May 25, 1978); Thompson
(D.D.C. 1976).
432 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1976); Hollander v. Clay, 420 F. Supp. 853
12. 31 U.S.C. § 232 (1970). See part III, infra, for a discussion of the procedural
mechanics of the Act.
13. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, §§ 1-7, 12 Stat. 696-98.
fraud
14. [The] Act was originally passed in 1863 after disclosure of widespread
clear
quite
seems
It
States.
the
Between
War
the
during
against the Government
property of
that the objective of Congress was broadly to protect the funds and
form, or
the Government from fraudulent claims, regardless of the particular
made.
function, of the government instrumentality upon which such claims were
See also
omitted).
(citation
(1957)
592
590,
U.S.
356
Rainwater v. United States,
REPORT No. 2, 37th
CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 952-58 (1863). See also H.R.
Cong., 2d Sess. Part 2 (1863).
15. Act of Mar. 2, 1877, tit. XXXVI, §§ 3490-3494, 18 Stat. 691-92 (civil and pro5438, 18 Stat. 1054
cedural provisions). Act of Mar. 2, 1877, ch. 5, tit. LXX, §
(criminal provision and penalty).
16. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 341, 35 Stat. 1153.
17. United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 307 n. 1 (1976).
enacted, and as it
18. Section 3490, the civil provision of the Act, as originally
still stands, reads as follows:
or in the
Any person not in the military or naval forces of the United States,
who
States,
United
the
of
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section
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by
prohibited
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damages
of
amount
the
double
addition,
in
and,
'2,000,
of
United States the sum
or committing
which the United States may have sustained by reason of the doing
damages shall be
such act, together with the costs of suit; and such forfeiture and
sued for in the same suit.
at 31 U.S.C. § 231
Act of Mar. 2, 1877, tit. XXXVI, § 3490, 18 Stat. 691 (codified
however, incor(1976),
231
§
U.S.C.
(1976)). The unofficial version of the Act, 31
and accompa16
&
15
notes
see
provision,
repealed
the
of
porates the actual language
it.
to
nying text supra, rather than merely making reference
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present criminal section is an amended and revised version of the
original criminal provision.1 9 The cases dealing with the test of civil
liability generally hold that subsequent amendments of the criminal
provision have no effect on the scope of the civil remedy.20 Accordingly, only those aspects of the criminal title that were part of the
statute at the time of the original recodification are relevant to the
scope of the civil remedy.2 ' Courts generally hold that the intent of
Congress to reach a broad spectrum of fraudulent activities is clear, 2
and that the Act must have broad application in order to effectuate its
manifest purpose.2 3 This broad view of the congressional purpose and
the scope of the statute has led to some conflict with the traditional
view that the Act, because it incorporates the language of the criminal
section, is penal and should be strictly construed. 2 ' In most applications, courts are now making a broad and liberal reading of the operation of the Act. 25

III.

PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS

The False Claims Act is a procedurally complex statutory remedy.
Section 232 provides that suits, under section 231, may be brought by
the government or by any other person at his own expense.26 The suit
must be brought in the name of the United States, and cannot be withdrawn or discontinued without the consent in writing of both the judge
and the United States Attorney, stating the reasons for the discontinuance or withdrawal.

27

When suit is filed by a private plaintiff, notice of the suit must be
given to the United States. 28 A copy of the complaint is served on the
19. 18 U.S.C. §§ 287, 1001, & Reviser's Note at 4187 (1976). This title has been
enacted into positive law by the Congress of the United States. The civil provisions

found in title 31, however, have not been so enacted, and the official version of the
Act is contained in the United States Revised Statutes. See note 18 supra. The substantive differences between the official and unofficial versions are minimal, and many
cases construing the Act refer to the United States Code in their decisions. See, e.g.,
United States v. Cooperative Grain & Supply Co., 476 F.2d 47, 50 & n. 1 (8th Cir.
1973); United States v. Mead, 426 F.2d 118, 121 (9th Cir. 1970).
20. See, e.g., Kessler v. Mercur Corp., 83 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1936).
21. See, e.g., Olson v. Mellon, 4 F. Supp. 947 (W.D. Pa. 1933), aff'd, 71 F.2d
1021 (3d Cir. 1934). See also Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590 (1957).

22. See, e.g., United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968); Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 592 (1957).
23. See note 22 supra.
24. See, e.g., Brensilber v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 320 U.S. 711 (1942).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Cooperative Grain & Supply Co., 476 F.2d 47 (8th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361 (D. Ore. 1885), aff'd, 30 F. 762 (9th
Cir. 1887).
26. 31 U.S.C. § 232(B) (1976).

27.

Id.

28.

31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (1976).
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United States Attorney together with a written disclosure of all information and evidence in possession of the plaintiff material to the prosecution of the suit.2 9 Although the statute requires disclosure of "all
3
information material to the prosecution of the suit," " the Department
of Justice feels that it is unclear whether anything more than a memo
indicating the basic nature of the allegations and type of evidence is
necessary. 3" Once notice has been effected by certified mail or personal
service, the United States has sixty- days in which to enter an appearance. If the United States does not enter the suit, the private plaintiff
may carry on the litigation. 32 If the United States does enter the suit,
the litigation will be pursued solely by the United States." Prior actions by the private plaintiff will not be binding on the United States
34
subsequent to its entry into the suit. If the United States enters the
suit and then fails to pursue it with "due diligence," the private plaintiff may resume the litigation six months from the date of the initial
appearance by the United States or such other date as the court may
set. 35
When the action is brought by a private plaintiff, the court will be
deprived of jurisdiction if it is shown-by any party-that the evidence
or information on which it is based was in the possession of any agency, officer, or employee of the United States at the time the suit was
initiated.3" It should be noted, however, that this is an affirmative
37
defense, not an affirmative burden of pleading on the complainant.
It is clear from the purpose of the Act that the knowledge of officers
or employees of the United States who are themselves defendants cannot deprive the court of jurisdiction.
If the United States decides to conduct the suit, the court may
award reasonable compensation out of the proceeds collected to the
private plaintiff for the disclosure of information or evidence not in
the possession of the United States when the action was filed. This
award may not exceed one-tenth of the proceeds of the suit or settlement.3 8 If the suit is litigated by the private plaintiff, the court may
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Conversations with United States Department of Justice, Civil Fraud Division, August 1978 [hereinafter cited as Conversations].
32. 31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (1976).
33. Id.
34. Id.

35. Id.
36.
37.
ed).
38.

Id.
The statute reads "whenever it shall be made to appear." Id. (emphasis add31 U.S.C. § 232(E)(1) (1976).
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award up to one-fourth of the proceeds of the suit or of the settlement
as compensation to the plaintiff for collecting forfeitures and damages
for the benefit of the government." The court may also award reasonable costs and expenses. 0 The statute, however, provides that a private
plaintiff is solely liable for any costs or expenses incurred; reimbursement is completely within the court's discretion. The statute further
bars any right of action by the private plaintiff against the United
States for reimbursement or indemnification of such expenses."'
IV.

CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT

The cases dealing with the Act generally state that the statute, in
theory, must be strictly and literally construed. 2 This interpretation
arises from the notion that statutes which are penal in nature are strictly construed."3 The statute derives its "penal" aspects primarily from
the incorporation of the original criminal provision." The language
itself, however, leaves room for speculation and interpretation. More
recent cases emphasize the broad, remedial nature of the Act and interpret the Act more liberally." The liberal judicial construction, taken
together with arguments for openness in government, favors a less
stringent interpretation when the Act is invoked against Members of
Congress.
To understand the statute, it is necessary to examine some of its
major elements. The following subsections examine the claim and the
connection of fraud to the claim, the knowledge and intent required
for liability, defenses which can be raised, and finally, cases applying
the Act to Members of Congress.
A.

The Claim and the Causal Relationship

The first requirement of the statute is that there be a claim."6 Two
issues arise with regard to the delineation of claims covered by the Act:
First, what constitutes an actual claim, and second, what degree of
causal connection is required between the fraud and the claim.
As the end result of any fraudulent activity, there must be an ac39. 31 U.S.C. § 232(E)(2) (1976).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. "[E]ven penal provisions must be 'given their fair meaning in accord with the
evident intent of Congress."' Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 593 (1958)
(citations omitted). See also Brensilber v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 320 U.S. 711
(1942).
43. United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 598 (1958).
44. See notes 17-21 and accompanying text supra.
45. See notes 22-25 and accompanying text supra.
46. 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1976).
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tual claim made against the government in order to trigger the operation of the statute. 7 Although there are recent cases holding to the
contrary, ' 8 'the majority view was that a claim is made, within the
meaning of the Act, only when payment has been made on the basis of
information submitted to the government by the alleged wrongdoers.41
In this regard, the conflict previously discussed between the strict,
penal and the liberal, remedial readings of the Act is again important.
In the past, because many, courts held that "claim" was to be strictly
construed, 5 0 they generally required the payment of money to complete
a claim. 5 More recently, the Supreme Court has held that "claim"
should not be read so narrowly that it includes only demands based on
5"
an alleged government liability to the claimant. The Court reasoned
that the Act is remedial in nature and reaches beyond the type of
claims subject to legal enforcement to any fraudulent attempt to cause
the government to pay out money."
The Act, as construed, reaches both direct and indirect claims. The
statutory language allows an action against anyone causing a claim to
be made.5 ' The courts have construed this element of causation liberally. 55 The Supreme Court stated the scope of causation under the
statute by holding that "[t]hese provisions, considered together, indicate a purpose to reach any person who knowingly assisted in causing
the government to pay claims which were grounded in fraud, without
regard to whether that person had direct contractual relations with the
government."

56

47. See, e.g., United States v. Cochran, 235 F.2d 131 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 941 (1956).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228 (1968), which provides a good discussion of the history of this aspect of the Act's operation.
49. The traditional rule strictly construed a claim as a demand for the transfer of
money or property based on the government's liability to the respondent; only such a
demand would satisfy the statute. See United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595 (1958);
United States v. Cohn, 270 U.S. 339 (1926). It is as yet unclear whether the holding in
Neifert- White will completely vitiate this definition of a claim. Although that case did
not overrule Cohn, which stated the strict rule, the Court did point that the facts in
Cohn took it outside the ambit of the Act, and therefore it should not be relied on as
defining the requirements of the Act.
50. See, e.g., United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595 (1958); United States v.
Cohn, 270 U.S. 339 (1926).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Howell, 318 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1963); United States
v. Cherokee Implement Co., 216 F. Supp. 374 (N.D. Iowa 1963). See also note 49 and
accompanying text supra.
52. United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228 (1968).
53. Id. at 233.
54. 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1976) states "who shall make or cause to be made, or present or cause to be presented."
55. See, e.g., United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228 (1968); Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
56. 317 U.S. at 544-45.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol4/iss1/6
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In Marcus v. Hess,57 for example, contractors were hired and paid
through local government units on Public Works Administration projects. 5 8 The suit in Marcus was brought by a private plaintiff who
claimed that the contractors involved had engaged in collusive bidding
on the projects and thereby defrauded the government. Some state
money was involved, but the bulk of the funding was from the United
States Government payable to the contractors through the local
government agency. The Court stated that "[gjovernment money is as
truly expended whether by checks drawn directly against the Treasury
to the ultimate recipient or by grants in aid to the States. . . .The
fraud here could not have been any more of an effort to cheat the
United States if there had been no state intermediary. '" 9 So long as
there is ultimately an actual claim made against the United States
Treasury, the courts will permit substantial attenuation between the
false claimant and the federal purse.
With regard to the relationship between the fraud and the claim,
courts have held that mere fraud or deceit in dealing with the government is not sufficient to trigger the statute." The statute bars fraud
"inconnection with" the making of a claim.' As with the interpretation of the claim itself, a fairly tenuous connection is allowed between
the fraudulent act and the actual claim to satisfy the Act. 62 In United
States v. Bornstein,63 however, the Supreme Court held that a person
may only be held liable under the statute for his or her own acts, not
those of another.
Intent and Knowledge

B.

The requirements of intent and knowledge, although separate elements of the statute, are closely connected. 6 A few of the cases, viewing the statute as essentially penal, have required the equivalent of
criminal mens rea. 65 The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has
57.

Id.

58. In Marcus, the actual transfer of federal funds into respondent's hands went
through several intermediary stages.

59. 317 U.S. at 544.
60. See, e.g., United States v. Howell, 318 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1963).
61. 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1976) encompasses conspiracy and aiding the making of a
claim. See United States v. Howell, 318 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1963); Cahill v. CurtissWright Corp., 57 F. Supp. 614 (W.D. Ky. 1944).
62. See, e.g., Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
63. 423 U.S. 303 (1976).
64. Except with regard to military property, where the statute specifies intent to
defraud, the statute speaks only of "knowing," which must be presumed to contain
the standard of intent.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Priola, 272 F.2d 589, 593-94 (5th Cir. 1959); United
States v. Schmidt, 204 F. Supp. 540, 543 (E.D. Wis. 1962).
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stressed the civil nature of the statute." Some intent to act, coupled
with knowledge of the falsity of the claim, is necessary. 7 Knowledge
of falsity is required by the statute.6 8 Intent in this context appears to
require a volitional and deliberate act, done with knowledge of the
misrepresentation and the specific purpose of defrauding the governis actually
ment. But some courts question whether purpose to defraud 69
statute.
the
under
intent
requisite
the
establish
to
necessary
There is, at the present time, an almost even split among the federal circuit courts of appeal. Perhaps a slightly smaller number of circuit courts require a purpose to defraud the government in addition to
the knowledge of the falsity of the claim. 0 The issue arises from the
1
use of the phrase, "false, fictitious, or fraudulent" claims. The
courts requiring specific intent hold that the traditional elements of
common-law fraud, including a purpose to defraud, must be proven,
and that the use of the phrase was only intended to insure the broad
coverage of the statute.7 The courts holding that specific intent is not
always necessary argue that some degree of traditional specific intent
might be required for "fraudulent" claims, but make a distinction between those and others that are merely "false" or "fictitious." 3 These
74
courts find that the phrase encompasses different standards of intent.
In United States v. Mead, 5 the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the use
of several terms was merely the result of the "draftsman's desire to encompass the varying ways in which fraud is defined.7 6 The court objected to eliminating the specific intent requirement.
66.

See, e.g., Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 550 (1943). See also United States v.

71.

31 U.S.C. § 231 (1976).

74.
75.
76.

476 F.2d at 56, 58.
426 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 123.

Hougham, 364 U.S. 310, 313 (1960); Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148,
152-54 (1956).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Cooperative Grain & Supply Co., 476 F.2d 47 (8th
Cir. 1973).
68. 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1976) states "knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or
fraudulent."
69. See United States v. Kennedy, 431 F. Supp. 877 (C.D. Cal. 1977). See also
United States v. Cooperative Grain & Supply Co., 476 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1973), which
held that knowledge, as manifested by "reckless disregard," is sufficient.
70. See Annot., 26 A.L.R. FED. 307 (1976). The Third, Fifth, Sixth and Ninth
Circuits require specific intent. The Fourth and the Tenth Circuits have rejected this
requirement. The Second, Seventh and Eighth Circuits have all rejected, in recent
cases, their prior acceptance of the requirement.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Mead, 426 F.2d 118, 123 (9th Cir. 1976).
73. See, e.g., United States v. NcNinch, 356 U.S. 595 (1958); United States v.
Cooperative Grain & Supply Co., 476 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1973).
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Judicial definition of fraud indicates that there is not an accepted distinction between a knowingly false claim and a fraudulent claim ....
Since
no reason appears for a partial elimination of the intent requirement, we
are unwilling to find a Congressional intent to make such a distinction by
subtle means. A further consideration is the familiar principle of construction that no statute is to be construed as altering the common law
further than its words import. Intent to defraud has always been an
essential element of common law fraud and Congressional intent to partially dispense with that element in the False Claims Act is lacking. 77
In United States v. Cooperative Grain & Supply Co.,78 the court
viewed intent differently. 9 The court found the arguments for requiring specific intent under the Act to be unpersuasive after a review of
both the legislative history and the words of the statute."0 "[T]he most

persuasive reason for not requiring a specific intent to defraud the
Government is that [the] Act is simply couched in broader terms. The
Act is remedial and in plain language covers the submission of a claim
known to be false."'" The court's discussion of intent, of which

knowledge is a part, centered on the volitional act in presenting the
claim and the "ill will" or specific intent to defraud. The court stated:
[T]he volitional action of intent is encompassed in words, e.g.,
"'present," "cause to be presented," and "makes, uses or causes to be
made." 31 U.S.C. § 321. Of course, the "ill will" part of intent is not encompassed in any part of the Act except the word "fraudulent." Intent,
therefore, includes the elements of the volitional action of presenting the
claim to the Government, the ill will towards the Government, and the
knowledge of the action itself. Although we think that "ill will" may be
inferred if the volitional action of presenting the claim and the element of
knowledge of falsity . . . are proved by the Government, we do not require that an "ill will" or a specific intent are necessary elements for an
actionable liability under the Act."
Thus, where specific intent is not required by the court, knowledge
will be the pivotal element. 8" In Cooperative Grain, the court carefully

analyzed the meaning of "knowledge" under the statute, stating that
"[A] necessary question . . . is whether 'knowing' under the False
Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 231, should be defined according to the crimi77. Id. (citations omitted).
78. 476 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1973).
79. Id. at 54-61.
80. Id. at 57-58.
81. Id. at 58.
82. Id. at 58-59 (citations omitted).
83. United States v. Cooperative Grain & Supply Co., 476 F.2d 47 (8th Cir.
1973).
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nal sense, which would usually hold negligence not to be the necessary
scienter, or its common accepted meaning in everyday usage in civil
84
and business operations."
Based on the fact that the Supreme Court has held the Act to be
remedial in nature, the Cooperative Grain court found that the guilty5
knowledge of criminal means rea was not the standard under the Act.
The court then proceeded to discuss the type of "knowledge" required
tort
in civil misrepresentation. Misrepresentation falls into the 8three
6 Because
classifications of negligence, intent, and strict responsibility.
the court had found that a "false claim" as well as "fraud" was actionable under the statute, negligent misrepresentation would satisfy
87
the requirement of "knowledge" under the Act. The court felt that
the varying phrases contained in the statute represented different
degrees of intent, and that the only one requiring specific intent was
in"fraud." The court felt that for misrepresentation, the intent could
8 Thus,
belief."
a
of
falsity
or
clude a "reckless disregard for the truth
where the courts find that specific intent is not required under the
statute, the scienter associated with common-law misrepresentation
will likely be the standard used. Where courts do find a necessity for
specific intent, the question of knowledge is subsumed by a finding of
such intent.
C. Defenses under the Statute
If the Act is considered to incorporate the elements of commonavailable
law actions in misrepresentation or fraud, then the defenses
8 9 The eleAct.
the
in those types of actions may be available under
ments of a common-law action in deceit are: (1) a false representation
of fact; (2) knowledge or belief by the defendant that the statement is
false; (3) an intent to induce the plaintiff to act in reliance on the misrepresentation; (4) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation by the
action; and (5)
plaintiff, manifested by action, or refraining from
90 Implicit in these
damage to the plaintiff as a result of such reliance.
9
elements are several defenses. ' For instance, if the statement alleged to
84. Id.at 59.
85. Id.at 59-60.
86. Id.at 60.
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing Cooper v. Schlesigner, 111 U.S. 148, 155 (1883)).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Mead, 426 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1970). The traditional
congressional immunities and defenses are discussed in Hollander v. Clay, discussed infra at notes 139-160 and accompanying text.
90. W. PROSSER, TORTS 685-86 (4th ed. 1971).
91. See generally W. PROSSER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 883-952 (6th ed.
1976).
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be a misrepresentation is one of opinion or of law, rather than of fact,
no action will lie. 92 If the defendant does not know or has no reason to
know that the statement is false, the action may be barred. 93 With
regard to intent, the result will vary depending upon the jurisdiction in
which the suit is brought, and the standard that has been adopted by
the court. 94 Some courts have held that simple negligence, as opposed
to reckless disregard, is sufficient for an action in misrepresentation. 95
Similarly with regard to the necessary manifestation of reliance, the
courts differ as to what is required under the Act. 96 Any instance in
which no actual damage has resulted by the loss of money from the
treasury will not likely be actionable. 97
Two recent cases have dealt with the nature of these common law
defenses. 98 In United States v. Ekelman & Associates, Inc. , the court
held that the action, under the Act, was one for intentional fraud and
misrepresentation. Accordingly, the burden was on the government to
show the requisite intent. Ekelman also set a stricter burden of persuasion, requiring proof of all elements by "clear and convincing evidence."
In United States v. Kates,' ° the court held that the action under
the Act was one for an intentional tort and that, therefore, contributory negligence was no defense. The court stated that the suit could be
defended only to the same extent as one for an intentional tort such as
fraud. The procedural requirements of the statute may also be used as
defenses. If the private plaintiff bases the suit on information already
in the possession of the United States, the court is deprived of jurisdiction. 1" In such a case, the plaintiff must either show an evidentiary
basis for the suit that is solely in his or her possession, or relinquish
pursuit of the action to the government. 02
The statute also provides time limits within which the government
must either prosecute the action or the private plaintiff will be entitled
to resume control of the suit.0 3 On expiration of this time period the
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

W. PROSSER, supra note 90, at 720-25.
Id. at 699-705.
See notes 68-82 and accompanying text supra.
W. PROSSER, supra note 90, at 705, summarizing relevant case law.
See notes 50-56 and accompanying text supra.

97.

But see note 53 and accompanying text supra.

98.

United States v. Ekelman & Assoc., Inc., 532 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976); United

States v. Kates, 419 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
99. 532 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976).
100. 419 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
101. 31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (1976).

102. Id.
103. Id. The statute provides that the United States has sixty days in which to enter
the suit, starting with the day on which they are served with notice. The statute further
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defendant may argue to the court that the United States, at least, has
been foreclosed from prosecution.

04
Causation may also operate as a defense.' If a defendant's actions can be shown to have an insufficient causal relationship to the
claim, or paying of the claim, the court may dismiss the action as to

that defendant.
D.

05

Litigation involving Members of Congress

The False Claims Act has been invoked against Members of Con0 6
gress for the alleged misuse of public funds only three times.' These
cases are, for the most part, an0 7 exercise in the mechanics of the statutory defense discussed above.'

In probably the most widely publicized of these cases, Congressman Wayne Hays was sued for having placed Elizabeth Ray on a secre08 The allegations were made
tarial salary in his congressional office.
that he "caused" a false claim by authorizing requests for payment of
09 The fraud
Ray's salary to the Clerk of the House of Representatives.
arose, it was alleged, because Ms. Ray was not a secretary, performed
no secretarial duties, was in no way qualified for the position or com'
petent to fulfill its responsibilities." Further, it was alleged that payment of the secretarial salary was in fact payment for personal services
rendered to the Congressman.II
Three separate complaints were filed, on various causes of action,
against Congressman Hays, former Congressman Kenneth Gray,
Elizabeth Ray, Donald Gosny-a Hays employee-and Dell Publishing Company." 2 The actions were instituted by several private plaintiffs." 3 The United States made a special appearance, moved to conprovides that if the United States does enter the suit, but fails to pursue it with due
diligence within six months of the initial appearance, the private plaintiff may resume
the litigation.
104. See notes 60-63 and accompanying text supra.
105. See, e.g., United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303 (1976).
106. Joseph v. Cannon, No. 77-0452 (D.D.C. May 25, 1978); Thompson v. Hays,
432 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1976); Hollander v. Clay, 420 F. Supp. 853 (D.D.C. 1976).
107. See note 101-03 and accompanying text supra. Further, section 232 provides
for loss of jurisdiction only in those suits brought by private plaintiffs under clause (B)
or those pending as of December 23, 1943, the date of the amendment adding these
procedural aspects, and does not mandate loss of jurisdiction where the United States
has taken over the suit from a private plaintiff.
108. Thompson v. Hays, 432 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1976).
109. Complaint at 4, Thompson v. Hays, 432 F. Supp. 253.
110. See generally Complaint, Thompson v. Hayes, 432 F. Supp. 253.

111.

Id.

112. Civil Action Nos. 76-1078, 76-1132, 76-1140 (Filed Oct. 26, 1976).
113. Edward Thompson, Anthony D. Cennamo, Anthony R. Martin-Trigona,
George R. Douglas, Jr.
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solidate the actions and together with all the defendants moved to
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, pursuant to the -provi14
sions of the statute.' '
The basis of the motions to dismiss was that the private plaintiffs
were in possession of no evidence or information that was not in the
possession of the Department of Justice at the time the suit was
brought."I5 It was conceded by the plaintiffs in their required disclosure statements" 6' that the bulk of their evidence and information was
obtained from either newspaper or magazine stories, a report of the
Clerk of the House of Representatives, or conversations with undisclosed individuals."17 The court found that where the information
upon which the suit is based has become public information through
its dissemination by the media, it is presumed to be information in the
possession of officers or agents of the United States and deprives the
court of jurisdiction.
It was the contention of the Department of Justice that this case
was premature." 18
This civil litigation, if allowed to continue, could easily interfere with the
presently developing criminal investigation. Moreover, if litigated by the
relators themselves on the basis of the information and resources presently professed by them, an adverse decision might collaterally estop the
Department of Justice from later filing a suit based upon a complete
review of all the information pertinent to the defendants' conduct and
liability. '
The motions to dismiss were granted. Under the statute, the government may choose whether or not to intervene and, if it intervenes, the
pace at which it will pursue the litigation. 2 o The Department of Justice
confirms that no criminal prosecution was ever instituted against Hays,
nor was the civil litigation ever resumed.' 2 '
In another case,' 2 2 suit was brought against Senator Howard Cannon to recover salaries paid to members of his personal staff. Staff
members were allegedly compensated from public funds for the performance of solely personal services. A major issue was the payment
114. 31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (1976). See notes 103 & 107 and accompanying text supra.
115. Id.
116. 31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (1976).
117. 432 F. Supp. at 256.
118. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to
Dismiss the Action for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction at 6, Thompson v. Hays,
432 F. Supp. 253.
119. Id.
120. See note 103 supra.
121. Conversations, supra note 31.
122. Joseph v. Cannon, No. 77-0452 (D.D.C. May 25, 1978).
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of a salary to Chester Sobsey, Cannon's administrative assistant and
codefendant. The primary allegation was that Sobsey worked exclusively on fund raising and other campaign related activities while on
the payroll of the Senate.' 2 3 The United States declined to enter the
suit,' 2' and it was carried forward by the private plaintiffs. In a terse
two page opinion,' the court found that a motion to dismiss, made
by defendants, should be granted on two grounds. One basis for the
dismissal was that "[d]efendant Cannon ... did file with the Secretary
of the Senate and publicly disclosed that defendant Sobsey was an aide
authorized to receive and distribute campaign contributions."" 6 The
court held that under the statute's provisions,1 27 this was sufficient information in the possession 2of some officer of the government to
deprive them of jurisdiction.'
This holding was based on Senate Rule XLIX,2 9 which permits the
designation of two staff assistants as being authorized to receive and
distribute campaign funds. 3 ' The activities of Mr. Sobsey, however,
violated federal criminal statutes. ' 3 I The Senate Rule allowing designation and disclosure cannot be an authorization of activities that contravene United States statutes. Although this rule appears to contradict
criminal statutes,3 2 Senate Rules or simple resolutions must be construed as consonant with, rather than contradictory to, statutory
law. 1
Knowledge of the designation of an aide to receive campaign funds
cannot be equated with knowledge of the fact that that aide was
employed exclusively to carry on campaign activities. The designation
and disclosure provisions of Rule XLIX carry no implication of fraud.
Therefore, the court's assumption that the suit was based solely on
evidence of the designation of two staff members authorized to handle
campaign funds, pursuant to the Rule, is of questionable validity. It
was precisely those activities outside the permissible scope of the
123. Complaint at 3, Joseph v. Cannon, No. 77-0452 (D.D.C. May 25, 1978).
124. 31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (1976).
.125. No. 77-0452 (D.D.C. May 25, 1978).
126. Memorandum and Order at 2, Joseph v. Cannon, No. 77-0452 (D.D.C. May
25, 1978).
127. 31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (1976).
128. Memorandum and Order at 2, Joseph v. Cannon, No 77-0452 (D.D.C. May
25, 1978).
129. S. Res. 110, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 5381 (1977).
130. Id.
131. 18 U.S.C. §§ 599-607 (1976) which prohibits solicitation and handling of campaign funds by federal employees.
132. Id.
133. Conversation with Staff Counsel, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, August 1978.
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Senate Rules which made the claim fraudulent in this case and it is
those activities that would be an unlikely subject of common knowledge.
The other basis for dismissal in the Cannon litigation was the
court's application of the requirement of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure '3" that in a case of fraud, the specific allegations must be included in the initial pleading.' "1The court found that specifics had not
been pleaded and dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.' 3 6 Leave to amend the complaint' 37 was
refused by the court. Under the liberal construction given the Federal
Rules, such leave generally should be granted.'3 8
In the third case brought against a Member of Congress, 31 9 suit was
filed against Representative William Clay by a private plaintiff on the
basis of Clay's alleged submission of false travel vouchers to the Clerk
of the House of Representatives. The Department of Justice elected to
enter the suit' 0 and filed an amended complaint that added two nonstatutory theories of recovery: unjust enrichment and payment under
mistake of fact."' The defendant raised four defenses to the action in
moving for dismissal, none of them based on the Act itself. The defenses
were that (1) the "speech or debate" clause' 2 barred the litigation, (2)
the "punishment or expulsion" clause'4 3 granted exclusive power to
Congress to discipline its own members, (3) the "political question"
doctrine deprived the court of jurisdiction to hear the case, and (4) the
statute providing for payments out of the contingent fund' made
134. FED.R.CIv.P. 9.
135. Id.
136. FED.R.CIv.P. 12(b)(6).
137. FED.R.CIv.P. 15.
138. See Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966). In Surowitz, the
Court found that the rules of procedure should not be construed todeny a litigant his
day in court if the complaint appears to state any basis for a valid claim. That case
dealt with a plaintiff that had a valid claim, but submitted a less than complete complaint. The majority of cases dealing with the scope and purpose of the Federal Rules
holds that they are intended to effectuate justice and to permit a trial on the merits for
any complaint that appears to have validity, despite apparent defects in pleading.
139. Hollander v. Clay, 420 F. Supp. 853 (D.D.C. 1976).
140. 31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (1976).
141. 420 F. Supp. 853, 855 (D.D.C. 1976).
142. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. "[Alnd for any Speech or Debate in either House,
they shall not be questioned in any other place." Id.
143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of
two thirds, expel a Member." Id.
144. 2 U.S.C. § 95 (1976) provides that:
No payment shall be made from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives unless sanctioned by the Committee on House Administration of the
House of Representatives. Payments made upon vouchers approved by said ComPublished by eCommons,
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conclusive the judgment of the Committee on Accounts of the House
of Representatives regarding the payment of vouchers.' 4 5
. The court decided that the traditional defenses of Members of
Congress would not bar the operation of the False Claims Act against
them. The court stated that the conduct of Members of Congress will
not be subject to judicial review, or made the basis of a civil or criminal proceeding, where such conduct is "within the sphere of legitimate
legislative activity. " 146 In Gravel v. United States,' 4 ' the Supreme
Court stated that a legislative act was:
[An integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by
which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with
respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution places within
the jurisdiction of either House .... [C]ourts have extended the privilege
to matters beyond pure speech or debate in either House, but "only when
necessary to prevent indirect impairment of such deliberations.'' 4
In Clay's case, the alleged purpose of the travel, "constituent com49
munication," was a political rather than a legislative activity.' The
court further found that the issue was the false filing or submission,
rather than the potential communication with constituents. 5 0
The court also noted that the pursuit of a civil action by the
Department of Justice in no way infringes upon the prerogative of
Congress to determine the behavior of its members, and to punish or
expel them for misconduct.' 5 ' The court said that the congressional option was unaffected by any potential civil liability, and that it was too
well settled for dispute that Members of Congress are within the ambit
of the Act.' 2
Under the "political question" doctrine, where the Constitution
makes a "textually demonstrable commitment." of power to resolve
certain issues to another branch of government, the judicial branch is
barred from operating in that area.' 3 Representative Clay argued that
mittee shall be deemed, held, and taken, and are declared to be conclusive upon
all the departments and officers of the Government: Provided, that no payment
shall be made from said contingent fund as additional salary or compensation to
any officer or employee of the House of Representatives.
145. 420 F. Supp. at 855.
146. Id.
147. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
148. Id. at 625.
149. 420 F. Supp. at 856.
150. ,Id.

151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 856-57.
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the "punishment or expulsion" provision"' evidenced such a commitment by granting Congress exclusive power to discipline its members." The court found, however, that civil liability for fraud was not
demonstrably granted to the legislative branch and that the doctrine,
therefore, presented no impediment to the litigation.' 1 6
Finally, the defendant argued that the statute governing approval
of payments from the contingent fund '" conclusively bars any review
of payments made from the contingent fund after approval by the
Committee on Accounts of the House of Representatives. Although
the statute does on its face ' bar any further action, the court found
that the congressional purpose was to prevent audit and review by the
Department of the Treasury which would delay payment of properly
approved vouchers. 119 The court reasoned that the payment statute
would not prevent the withholding of payment where it would be prohibited by law, that the False Claims Act was drafted specifically to
cover fraudulent claims, and that it intended to include Members of
Congress.' 6 0 Consequently, the court imposed liability.
V. APPLICATION TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESSSOME CONCLUSIONS
Several questions concerning the application of the Act to Members of Congress are partially unanswered. The requisite degree of intent required by the statute, for instance, is an important issue. Insofar
as Members of Congress are involved, it is difficult to predict what will
be the requisite degree of knowledge and intent. If the broad interpretation of knowledge and intent, as espoused in United States v.
Cooperative Grain,'' is accepted, the preparation of a "false" claim
or voucher by a staff assistant for a Member of Congress may be sufficient to create liability in the Member of Congress. The key issue may
well be the willingness of courts to impute to a Member of Congress
the knowledge of an aide's misconduct where the Member has good
reason to know of the falsification.
Another question is the permissible degree of attenuation between
the fraudulent act, or actor, and the actual making of the claim.' 6 2
154.

U.S. CONST. art.

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

420 F. Supp. at 856.
Id. at 857.
2 U.S.C. § 95 (1976). See note 144 supra.
Id.
420 F. Supp. at 857-58.
Id. at 858.
476 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1973). See notes 78-85 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 61 & 62 and accompanying text supra.

Published by eCommons,

I, § 5. See note 143 supra.

UNIVERSITY OF DA YTON LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 4:1

Although United States v. Bornstein'6' limits liability to one's own
acts, if negligence or an inference of knowledge can result in liability,
the distance at which the inference can arise becomes an important
issue. The "fraudulent" activities of a Congressman's staff might
cause the imposition of liability on higher level aides or the Members
of Congress themselves, regardless of their actual knowledge of misrepresentation.
In suits brought by private plaintiffs, an important question arises
as to what evidence the courts will consider sufficient to establish the
defense that the information on which the suit is based was in the
possession of the government at the time the litigation was instituted.
These suits are likely to be brought by a private plaintiff because
covert activities are more likely to be known to persons who are intimately involved with the functioning of a Member's office and staff.
Both the Hays and Cannon actions were ultimately instituted by attorneys to whom information had allegedly come through staff assistants.
The problem was that the information had become public knowledge
through the media by the time of the filing of the actions, and there65
fore was held to be "in the possession of ...the United States."' In
most situations involving a Member of Congress, by the time the
fraudulent activities are discovered or an insider chooses to disclose
them, they will often have been uncovered by the media as well. Even
assuming that a suit is filed prior to the appearance of a news report,
the defendant will likely attempt to show that the information was in
the possession of some agent of the United States. Thus, it is the more
subtle and insidious practices that may, because of the courts' posture,
be most easily reached under the Act; blatantly fraudulent activities are
more susceptible to the "evidence in possession" defense.
There is an extreme, though understandable, reluctance on the part
of the Department of Justice to pursue this type of litigation against
66
Members of Congress. The Department of Justice's informal policy'
is to enter a memorandum with the court stating its opinions with
regard to the suit, even where it chooses not to enter it. Such an action
is not required where the Department of Justice declines to enter the
suit, but may well influence the decision of the court. The Department
of Justice can also move to dismiss, as it did in Hays, pending the outcome of a criminal investigation.' 67 In Hays, the motion was granted
163. 423 U.S. 303 (1976). See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
164. 31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (1970).
165. Id.
166. Conversations, supra note 31.
167. See notes 118 & 119 and accompanying text supra.
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on the ground that the evidence on which the suit was based was taken
from public sources and must therefore be in the possession of the
United States, depriving the court of jurisdiction. There is, however, a clear question whether this type of consideration might move a
court to grant a motion to dismiss on a much more narrow showing.
When the government has an interest in defeating the litigation, it can
effectively do so. Where a Member of Congress is involved, there is a
marked tendency to follow just such a course of action. The Depa'tment of Justice and the courts appear willing to liberally construe the
disclosure and possession elements of the Act. In the litigation that has
taken place, the net result has been the dismissal of two of the three
16 8
cases involving Members of Congress.
None of the foregoing considerations, however, forecloses the
possibility of a Member's liability under the Act. Under the decision in
Hollander v. Clay," 9 the traditional congressional immunities and
defenses do not protect a Member's illegal activities within the ambit
of the False Claims Act. If a plaintiff is careful in collecting and
documenting evidence of covert activities not public or in government
possession, the suit cannot be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Some
activities are so venal that the Department of Justice would probably
bring an action even if a private plaintiff was blocked by information
in the government's possession. At that point, the issues of inference
of knowledge, negligence, and the attenuation of the relationship
discussed above become important. It remains to be seen where courts
will draw the lines.
Trienah A. Meyers
168.

See notes 106-160 and accompanying text supra.

169.

420 F. Supp. 853 (D.D.C. 1976).
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